Abstract. Recent advances in the design and analysis of secure two-party key exchange (2KE) such as the leakage of ephemeral secrets used during the attacked sessions remained unnoticed by the current models for group key exchange (GKE). Focusing on a special case of GKE -the tripartite key exchange (3KE) -that allows for efficient one-round protocols, we demonstrate how to incorporate these advances to the multi-party setting. From this perspective our work closes the most pronounced gap between provably secure 2KE and GKE protocols. The proposed 3KE protocol is an implicitly authenticated protocol with one communication round which remains secure even in the event of ephemeral secret leakage. It also significantly improves upon currently known 3KE protocols, many of which are insecure. An optional key confirmation round can be added to our proposal to achieve the explicitly authenticated protocol variant.
GKE models, e.g. [5, 21] , considered weak corruptions allowing the adversary to obtain users' static keys, but not their ephemeral session secrets. Later models, e.g. [9, 8, 14] assumed strong corruptions allowing the adversary to learn both static private keys and session specific secrets through a single query. Manulis and Bresson [8] , inspired by the two-party approach in [10] refined the notion of strong corruptions in GKE allowing the adversary to obtain static keys independently from ephemeral session secrets; yet, restricting the leakage of ephemeral secrets to sessions for which the adversary does not need to distinguish the key. The reason is that GKE protocols known today become insecure if ephemeral secrets used to compute a group key leak, in other words leaking ephemeral secrets of one session affects the security of other non-partnered sessions. As a result many GKE protocols are insecure if parties for better performance pre-compute their ephemeral secrets off-line. Gorantla et. al. [14] subsequently strengthened [8] by considering key compromise impersonation attacks.
Despite of their significant improvement over the years GKE models remain incomparable to the 2KE models in terms of security guarantees they provide. In contrast to the 2KE models such as [23, 31] , GKE models do not consider leakage of ephemeral secrets for the session which is to be proven AKEsecure. In this paper we aim to fix the gap between 2KE and GKE models. Focusing on AKE-security we first revise the latest GKE models to accommodate leakage of ephemeral secrets against the attacked session. In order to illustrate that our model is reasonable and practical for our analysis we focus on three-party key exchange (3KE), which is a special class of GKE protocols and come up with a provably secure solution that resists these stronger leakage attacks.
Notation. Letê : G × G → G T be a non-degenerate bilinear map from a group G to a group G T both of prime order q. Let P be a generator of G; for a user U A we set U A 's static and ephemeral keys S A = s A P and X A = x A P , respectively. The lowercase letters are the private keys.
Three vs two party key establishment
Antoine Joux [17, 18] used properties of pairings to extends the classical (unauthenticated) two-party Diffie-Hellman protocol [13] to the case of three parties, preserving the optimal one-round communication complexity. Since then tripartite key exchange as a special form of group key exchange has gained attention of the research community and several attempts have been made to improve the original protocol in order to enlarge the class of attacks it can resist.
Authenticating outgoing messages
Shim [32] argued that Joux's protocol fails to a variant of the well know person-in-the-middle attack against the (unauthenticated) Diffie-Hellman protocol. To address that shortcoming Shim proposed a protocol where Alice broadcasts
Upon exchanging these ephemeral public keys the parties compute t =ê(P, P ) s A s B s C and the session key
Shim's protocol fails to key compromise impersonation attack [33, 29] . Suppose Malice sends two ephemeral public keys uP and vP to Alice on behalf of Bob and Charlie respectively. With the knowledge of Alice's static private key Malice can compute t; with the knowledge of u Malice can also compute k =ê(vP, T A ) ut , which is the key Alice computes. Lin and Lin [29] observe that the attack is possible since Shim's protocol does not authenticate the T A 's origin. To resolve such issues one venue is introducing new elements into the communicated messages: along the ephemeral public key a user could append extra information that identifies messages' origin or provides evidence for following protocol specifications. For example [11] requires that along the message in Shim's protocol Alice also computes and broadcasts X A = x A P ; the suggested session key is
Suppose, however, that an adversary Malice can obtain a certificate for an ephemeral public key X A used by Alice. Malice can then send X M = S A , T M = T A , and the certificate to Bob and Charlie. As a result Bob and Charlie will believe the session key is shared with Malice, whereas the key is shared with Alice, who correctly identifies all session peers. This example resembles Kaliski's on-line unknown key share (UKS) attack [19] on the MQV protocol [26] . It is plausible [22, §7.3] , that the ephemeral public keys pre-computed for efficiency reasons are not as securely stored as the ephemeral private keys. In that case the UKS attack can be made off-line implying that timing information leakage has important security consequences.
The modification to Shim's protocol in [29] requires that in addition to T A , Alice also computes and broadcasts
Bob and Charlie verify Alice's message by computing t A = u A −1 mod q, z A = t A m A mod q, and checking that
The session key (as computed by Alice) is
Malice can easily circumvent the verification by selecting a random integer m B , setting
and sending these values on Bob's behalf to Alice and Charlie; see also [28, §4.1] . Alice (as well as Charlie) compute t B = −1 −1 = −1 mod q, z B = −m B mod q and verify Equation 5 namely,
Subsequently, Alice computes the key
With the knowledge of m B Malice can compute the same session key. Lim et al. [28] further propose a "fix" to the above problem that requires additional information in the messages and further verification procedures. However, as observed in [27, §4.2], u A relates the static and ephemeral key such that given the static private key s A an adversary can derive the ephemeral private key x A and thereafter recover the session key, so protocols with u A as in Equation 4 do not provide forward secrecy. As an alternative [27] suggests W A = x A H(x A )(S A ), n A = H(T A , W A , p A ) for a time stamp p A , and
The above examples aimed to provide certain assurances about incoming messages without allegedly sacrificing security. Compilers can be viewed as an abstraction to such approach, at the expense of overhead like complicated messages or more communication rounds. A more rigorous analysis of that approach can be found in [21, 16] .
Ephemeral key leakage has been motivated for two party key agreement protocols [10, 23, 34] , but so far we did not include it in our analysis. In Equation 8 if s A is leaked the adversary cannot obtain x A , but if x A is leaked, then the adversary can easily obtain the static secret s A . Furthermore, in [24] authors observed that within a party cryptographic primitives can share the source of randomness; if the source is weak then signature schemes such as DSA can leak static private keys. Therefore, in the presence of leakage of ephemeral private information compilers' based solutions are non-trivial to adopt.
Al-Riyami and Patterson protocols
Al-Riyami and Patterson [1] proposed four one round three party key agreement protocols. The design aims to "avoid the use of expensive signature computations". The protocols broadcast a message consisting of a single ephemeral public key along with necessary certificates, but differ in the key derivation procedures which are inspired by two-party protocols. These protocols inherit vulnerabilities from the underlying two-pass protocols, but suggest that lessons from two-party protocols should be applied to three-party protocols. In the TAK-4 protocol, akin to MQV [26] and HQMV [23] , Alice, Bob and Charlie after exchanging static-ephemeral key pairs (S A , X A ), (S B , X B ) and (S C , X C ), respectively, compute the session key
Given, the complicated HMQV security argument it is not surprising that no security argument for TAK-4 is provided. In fact as described in [1] TAK-4 fails to the following UKS attack in which Alice and Bob will falsely think that they share a key with Malice, whereas Charlie correctly identifies his peers as Alice and Bob. In the attack Malice, who owns a certificate for the public key 1 G 2 , intercepts all public keys and computes
Therefore, by sending (S M , X M ) instead of (S C , X C ) to Alice or Bob, Malice successfully mounts a UKS attack on TAK-4. The possibility of such attacks is acknowledged in [1] , which also offers two alternatives to prevent them. The requirements in [1] do not prevent the adversary from mounting the above attack thus the more sound approach is to include identities in the key derivation as typically done in two party key agreement. In general fewer assumptions and primitives are better as they leave less room for security vulnerabilities.
Ephemeral information leakage
In general, the security considerations important for two-party protocols are also relevant for multiparty protocols. Motivation for ephemeral information leakage is independent from number of users involved in a key agreement protocol. Primitives used in compilers often assume no ephemeral key leakage. Thus, it is worth considering implicitly authenticated key exchange protocols. Ephemeral keys introduce further security aspects. For example, in Shim's protocol leaking static keys does not reveal the past session keys, but an adversary that can access one ephemeral and one static private key from different users can compute the session key. So, for a party concerned with forward secrecy with respect to its own static key, there is a difference if its peer static or ephemeral private key is leaked: the session key is still secure in the former case but no longer in the latter.
Implicitly authenticated tripartite protocol
Informally, in our proposed protocol P parties exchange ephemeral and static keys and derive the keying material as described bellow. Optionally, there can be a key confirmation round.
Initialization. User U i performs:
1. Select an ephemeral private key
Derivations. Upon receiving the first round of messages U i does the following:
To complete the session U i does:
1. Destroy the session state. 2. Accept the session key k.
Key material. On input (U i , rl, sid i , x i , s i ) the auxiliary key derivation KeyDer computes:
3. Compute
4. Compute
5. Compute
Instances with the same session id sid, and hence with the same ephemeral public keys and partners, compute the same output since
A special attention should be paid to the content of the internal state which by definition contains only the ephemeral private keys used by session throughout the protocol execution. Neither the static private key s i , nor the values σ 0 . . . σ 3 , nor the derived key material become part of the session state. This is different from the definition used in [12] , where the model allows the adversary to learn the complete state of the Turing machine. Our formulation is similar to the more common approach for two party Diffie-Hellman protocols, see for example [10, 23, 34] , where the session state consists only of the ephemeral private key x i used by U i .
To include key confirmation, the output of H is modified to (k m , k). Furthermore, after Derivation and before Completion users perform the following:
Confirmation. To execute key confirmation U i does:
Verification. U i verifies that the incoming T i+1 and T i+2 are equal to the tags stored in the session state.
In the analysis of many two-party protocols ephemeral public and private keys can be obtained by the adversary only during the session execution. Thus such arguments do not cover pre-computed ephemeral key pairs. In some cases the adversary may be able to recover past ephemeral keys. For this reason in our protocol description the ephemeral key pairs are pre-computed and the adversary can access them before event the session is initialized. Indeed the Initialization stage can be performed long before the Communication stage. Similarly, the protocol description does not explicitly destroy the ephemeral private key (but should be done in practice) to allow the possibility that the adversary obtain the ephemeral key after observing some subsequent actions of the parties. These modifications only increase the power of the adversary and does not decrease it relative to the usual approach where ephemeral keys can be obtained only during the session execution.As mentioned in the introduction, Bresson and Manulis [8] considered leakage of ephemeral secrets from the internal states prior to the execution of a session, thus incorporating pre-computations into the model, and also after the completeness of the session, thus implicitly requiring the erasure of ephemeral secrets from the state. However, their approach disallows leakage of ephemeral secrets during the execution of the session.
The Model and Security Definitions
Our model can be seen as an extension of the strong authenticated key exchange model for two-party protocols from [31] to the group setting. It is described using the classical notations and terminology from previous models for GKE protocols, in particular those in [21, 8, 14] .
Protocol Participants and Initialization Let U := {U 1 , . . . , U N } be a set of potential protocol participants and each user U i ∈ U is assumed to hold a static private/public key pair (s i , S i ) generated by some algorithm Gen(1 κ ) on a security parameter 1 κ during the initialization phase.
Protocol Sessions and Instances Any subset of U can decide at any time to execute a new protocol session and establish a common group key. Participation of some U ∈ U in multiple sessions is modeled through an number of instances {Π Correctness. A GKE protocol is said to be correct if, when in the presence of benign 7 adversary all instances invoked for the same protocol session accept with the same session group key.
Freshness. The classical notion of freshness of some instance Π s U is traditionally used to define the goal of AKE-security by specifying the conditions for the Test(Π s U ) query. For example, the model in [21] defines an instance Π s U that has accepted as fresh if none of the following is true: (1) at some point, A asked RevealKey to Π s U or to any of its partnered instances; or (2) a query RevealStaticKey(U * ) with U * ∈ pid s U was asked before a Send query to Π s U or any of its partnered instances. Unfortunately, these restrictions are not sufficient for our purpose since Π s U becomes immediately unfresh if the adversary gets involved into the protocol execution via a Send query after having learned the static key s U * of some user U * those instance participates in the same session as Π s U . We fairly remark that [21] does not address (strong) corruptions of ephemeral secrets.
The recent model in [8] defines freshness using the additional AddUser and RevealState queries as follows. According to [8] , an instance Π s U that has accepted is fresh if none of the following is true: (1) A queried AddUser(U M , S U M ) with some U * ∈ pid s U ; or (2) at some point, A asked RevealKey to Π s U or any of its partnered instances; or (3) a query RevealStaticKey(U * ) with U * ∈ pid s U was asked before a Send query to Π s U or any of its partnered instances; or (4) A queried RevealState to Π s U or any of its partnered instances at some point after their invocation but before their acceptance.
Although this definition is already stronger than the one in [21] it is still insufficient for the main reason that it excludes the leakage of ephemeral secrets of instances in the period between the protocol invocation and acceptance. Also this definition of freshness does not model key compromise impersonation attacks.
The recent update of the freshness notion in [14] addressed the lack of key compromise impersonation resilience. In particular, it modifies the above condition (3) . This condition should allow the adversary to obtain static private keys of users prior to the execution of the attacked session while requiring its benign behavior with respect to the corrupted user during the attack.
Yet, this freshness requirement still prevents the adversary from obtaining ephemeral secrets of participants during the attacked session. What is needed is a freshness condition that would allow the adversary to corrupt users and reveal the ephemeral secrets used by their instances in the attacked session at will for the only exception that it does not obtain both the static key s U * and the ephemeral secrets used by the corresponding instance of U * ; otherwise security can no longer be guaranteed. In the following we give the combined definition of freshness taking into account the previously described problems. Note that since U ∈ pid s U and since the notion of partnering is self-inclusive Condition 3 prevents the simultaneous corruption of static and ephemeral secrets for the corresponding instance Π s U as well. In case when users are allowed to own two partnering instances i.e., they can initiate protocols with themselves the last condition should be modified to say that the number of instances U equals the number of times U appears in pid s U . Note also that the above definition captures key-compromise impersonation resilience through Condition 4: A is allowed to corrupt participants of the test session in advance but then must ensure that instances of such participants have been honestly participating in the test session. In this way we exclude the trivial break of security where A reveals static keys of users prior to the test session and then actively impersonates that users during it. On the other hand, as long as A remains benign with respect to such users their instances will still be considered as fresh.
AKE-Security. We are ready to generalize the strong AKE-security definition from [25, 31] to a group setting.
Definition 2. Let P be a correct GKE protocol and τ be a uniformly chosen bit. We define the adversarial game Game ake−τ A,P (κ) as follows: after initialization, A interacts with instances via queries. At some point, A queries Test(Π s U ), and continues own interaction with the instances until it outputs a bit τ . If Π s U to which the Test query was asked is fresh at the end of the experiment then we set Game ake−τ A,P (κ) = τ .
We define: Adv ake A,P (κ) := |2 Pr[τ = τ ] − 1| and denote with Adv ake P (κ) the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries A. We say that a GKE protocol P provides strong AKE-security if this advantage is negligible.
Security Arguments
In this section, we provide security arguments of the proposed implicitly authenticated tripartite protocol. We need the gap BDH(Bilinear Diffie-Hellman) assumption, where one tries to compute BDH(U, V, W ) accessing the BDDH oracle. Here, we denote BDH(U, V, W ) =ê(P, P ) log U log V log W , and the BDDH oracle on input (uP, vP, wP,ê(P, P )
x ) returns the bit 1 if uvw = x and the bit 0 otherwise.
Theorem 1.
If G is a group where gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption holds and H and H e are random oracles, the proposed implicitly authenticated tripartite protocol in Section 3 is secure in the sense of Definition 2.
Proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A. Here, we give an intuition of the proof. We denote by (S 0 , X 0 ), (S 1 , X 1 ), (S 2 , X 2 ) the static and ephemeral public keys of users U 0 , U 1 , U 2 in the test session sid t . Consider the case, where user U 0 is honest, ephemeral public key X 0 is not revealed, and static public keys S 1 and S 2 are not revealed. In this case, solver S embeds instance (U, V, W ) of gap BDH problem as X 0 = U, S 1 = V, S 2 = W . Since H is random oracle, adversary A need to ask
, to distinguish the session key. Since user U 0 is honest, solver S knows s 0 = log(S 0 ). By using s 0 , solver S can compute four independent terms w.r.t. s 1 = log(S 1 ) and s 2 = log(S 2 ):
, and σ 3 =ê(X 1 +
. By using these four independent terms, solver S can compute answer of gap BDH problem ((σ
. This is why the proposed protocol uses four terms σ 0 , σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 .
A Outline of Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we provide outline of proof of Theorem 1, because of page limitation. We need the gap BDH(Bilinear Diffie-Hellman) assumption, where one tries to compute BDH(U, V, W ) accessing the BDDH oracle. Here, we denote BDH(U, V, W ) =ê(P, P ) log U log V log W , and the BDDH oracle on input (uP, vP, wP,ê(P, P ) x ) returns the bit 1 if uvw = x and the bit 0 otherwise.
Let κ denote the security parameter, and let A be a polynomially (in κ) bounded adversary. We assume that A succeeds in an environment with n users, activates at most s sessions within a user. We use A to construct a gap BDH solver S that succeeds with non-negligible probability. The adversary A is said to be successful with non-negligible probability if A wins the distinguishing game with probability Let the test session be sid t = (P, UA, XA, UB, XB, UC , XC ). Let H * be the event that A queries H with (σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3, sid t ). Let H * be the complement of event H * . Let sid * be any completed session owned by an honest user such that sid * = sid t and sid * is non-matching to sid t . Since sid * and sid t are distinct and non-matching, the inputs to the key derivation function H are different for sid t and sid * . Since H is a random oracle, A cannot obtain any information about the test session key from the session keys of non-matching sessions. Hence Pr(M ∧ H * ) ≤ 
, whence Pr(M ∧ H * ) ≥ p(κ). Henceforth the event M ∧ H * is denoted by M * . We will consider the not exclusive classification of all possible events in the following tables. In the tables, we denote by (A, X), (B, Y ), (C, Z) the static and ephemeral public keys of users UA, UB, UC in the test session sid t . Events can be classified not exclusively as in Table 1 when A, B, C are distinct, as in Table 2 when A = B = C, as in Table 3 when A = C = B, as in Table 4 when A = B = C, and as in Table 5 when A = B = C. Since the classification covers all possible events, at least one event Exy ∧ M * in the tables occurs with non-negligible probability, if event M * occurs with non-negligible probability. Thus, the gap BDH problem can be solved with non-negligible probability, and that means we shows that the proposed protocol is secure. We will investigate each of these events in the following subsections.
A.1 Event E 1a ∧ M * Setup The algorithm S begins by establishing n honest users that are assigned random static key pairs. S embed instance (U, V, W ) of gap BDH problem as follows. S randomly selects three users UA, UB, UC and integer i ∈R [1, s] . S selects static and ephemeral key pairs on behalf of honest users with the following exceptions. The i-th ephemeral public key X selected on behalf of UA is chosen to be U , the static public key B selected on behalf of UB is chosen to be V , and the static public key C selected on behalf of UC is chosen to be W , S does not possess the corresponding static and ephemeral private keys.
A.2 Other Events
Event E 1b ∧ M * Same as the event E1a ∧ M * in Subsection A.1, except the following points. In Setup, S embeds gap BDH instance (U, V, W ) as A = U, B = V, C = W . In Simulation of H, S extracts BDH(U, V, W ) as follows:
((σ Event E 3 a ∧ M * and E 3 b ∧ M * Events E 3 a ∧ M * and E 3 b ∧ M * can be handled in the same way as events E3a ∧ M * and E 3b ∧ M * in Subsection A.2 because of symmetry of B and C, respectively.
A.3 Other Cases
In the case of A = B = C, events E Table 2 can be handled same as events E 1b , E2a, E 3b , E 3 a in Table 1 , with condition A = B = C.
In the case of A = C = B, events E Table 3 can be handled same as events E 1b , E2a, E3a, E 3 b in Table 1 , with condition A = C = B.
In the case of A = B = C, events E Table 4 can be handled same as events E1a, E 1b , E2a, E 2b in Table 1 , with condition A = B = C.
In the case of A = B = C, events E
